Multiplpe Choice Minority Game With Different Publicly Known Histories by Chau, H. F. et al.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
50
41
34
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  6
 Se
p 2
00
5
Multiple Choice Minority Game With Different Publicly Known Histories
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In the standard Minority Game, players use historical minority choices as the sole public infor-
mation to pick one out of the two alternatives. However, publishing historical minority choices is
not the only way to present global system information to players when more than two alternatives
are available. Thus, it is instructive to study the dynamics and cooperative behaviors of this ex-
tended game as a function of the global information provided. We numerically find that although
the system dynamics depends on the kind of public information given to the players, the degree of
cooperation follows the same trend as that of the standard Minority Game. We also explain most
of our findings by the crowd-anticrowd theory.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.70.Fh, 89.75.-k
I. INTRODUCTION
Many phenomena in a variety of fields including biol-
ogy and economics can be modeled by agent-based com-
plex adaptive systems (CAS) [1, 2, 3]. In fact, CAS
can be used to gain empirical understanding, normative
understanding, qualitative insight and theory generation
together with methodological advancement in economic
systems. This agent-based approach focuses on the dy-
namics and the effects of the initial or boundary condi-
tions on an economic system as opposed to the conven-
tional economic methodology which concentrates mainly
on the equilibrium state of the system [3]. In this respect,
techniques in statistical physics and non-linear dynamics
can be applied in the study of economic systems. This is
the goal of the rapidly growing field of econophysics.
Minority Game (MG) [4] is perhaps the simplest agent-
based econophysical model that captures the minority
seeking behavior of independent selfish players. In the
original version of MG, each player picks one out of
two alternatives in each time step based on the pub-
licly posted minority choices of the previous M turns.
Those correctly picking the minority choice are awarded
one dollar while the others are deducted one dollar. Al-
though players in MG are selfish and only aim at max-
imizing their own wealth, they do so in a cooperative
manner. In addition, MG exhibits a second order phase
transition point dividing the parameter space into the
so-called symmetric and asymmetric phases [4, 5]. Be-
sides, the cooperation phenomenon and the phase tran-
sition point appear to be very common as they are also
observed in several variants of MG that use more than
two alternatives [6, 7], evolving strategies [8, 9], different
payoff functions [10, 11], different network topology [12]
and a mixed population of players [13, 14].
In MG, some public information is given to players for
∗Electronic address: hfchau@hkusua.hku.hk
reference in making their decisions. In both the original
MG and many of its variants, the public information is
the minority choices of the previous M turns. In other
words, this public information gives a complete descrip-
tion of historical winning choices of the previousM turns.
Of course one may give other public information to play-
ers. Perhaps the most well-known case comes from a
series of studies concerning the relevance of history in
MG that was initiated by a paper of Cavagna [15]. This
series of studies investigated the effect of replacing the
actual historical winning choices by some fake ones on
the dynamics of MG. For instance, Challet and Marsili
extensively studied the effect of substituting a randomly
and independently chosen bit string for each historical
minority choice on the dynamics of MG. They found that
although the modified game still shows phase transition
right at the same point in the parameter space, the dy-
namics is markedly different from the original MG in the
asymmetric phase [16]. Their findings were echoed by a
recent work of Ho et al. who discovered that the dynam-
ics of the original and the modified game also differ in the
symmetric phase [17]. Other examples of using different
public information came indirectly from the investiga-
tions of players with different memory sizes [4, 18] and
players acting only on local information [12, 19]. These
studies showed that the dynamics in many variants of
MG depends on the historical outcomes of the game.
Nonetheless, publishing the historical winning choices
of the previous M turns is not the only way to present
certain real global information of the system to players.
For example, it is instructive to investigate what will hap-
pen if the publicly known historical minority choice is re-
placed by the publicly known historical majority choice.
In the case of the original MG [4, 5], the statistical prop-
erties of this majority history model is identical to that of
the original MG as the knowledge of the historical major-
ity choice is equivalent to that of the historical minority
choice. In contrast, the situation is radically different
when the number of alternatives in the model is greater
than two. An extension of MG that allows more than two
2alternatives was proposed by Ein-Dor et al. [20]. They
regarded the alternatives as states of Potts spins and re-
placed player’s strategies by feedforward neural networks
with Hebbian learning rules. Their model is not suitable
to study the effect of global information replacement as
the method used by players to decide their choices is also
changed. Thus, our study is based on a simpler exten-
sion of the standard MG proposed by Chau and Chow [6]
that allows players to choose fromNc > 2 equally capable
alternatives with different types of publicly posted real
histories without changing the algorithm of player’s de-
cision. Our numerical simulations show that the general
trend of the cooperative behavior does not depend on the
kind of common real historical data used. In addition, we
find that the location of the second order phase transition
point separating the symmetric and asymmetric phases
is independent of the publicly posted histories. Most of
our findings can be understood by the crowd-anticrowd
theory proposed by Hart et al. [21, 22].
II. THE GAME MG(Nc) AND ITS EXTENSION
Our study focuses on an extension of the MG known
as MG(Nc) proposed by Chau and Chow in Ref. [6]. In
MG(Nc), each of the N players picks one out of Nc alter-
natives independently in each turn where Nc is a prime
power.1 The choice picked by the least non-zero num-
ber of players is said to be the (1st) minority choice in
that turn. Those who have picked the minority choice
will be awarded one dollar while the others will be de-
ducted one dollar. (In this respect, the Nc alternatives
are treated on equal footing in this game.) The minority
choices of the previous M turns are publicly announced.
To aid each player making their decisions, each of them is
randomly and independently assigned once and for all S
deterministic strategies before the game begins. A strat-
egy is a table that assigns every possible history (in this
case, the 1st minority choice of the previous M turns)
to a choice. In other words, it is a map from the set of
all possible histories H to the finite field of Nc elements
GF (Nc). Clearly, there are totally N
NM
c
c different pos-
sible strategies and this collection of strategies is called
the full strategy space. To evaluate the performance of a
strategy, a player looks at the virtual score which is the
current hypothetical wealth if that strategy were used
throughout the game. Every player follows the choice of
1 There are two reasons why we restrict Nc be to a prime power.
(Definitions of various terms in this footnote can be found later
in the text.) First, finding the maximal reduced strategy space
size is a very difficult combinatorial problem whose solution is
not known for a general Nc to date. Second, even if the maximal
reduced strategy space is found, it is possible that such space is
not uniformly distributed in the full strategy space. Hence, the
expression of the control parameter α is not known when Nc is
not a prime power.
his/her current best working strategy, namely, the one
with the largest virtual score, to pick an alternative [6].
(In case of a tie, the player randomly picks one from
his/her pool of best working strategies.)
Now, we consider a generalization of the MG(Nc)
model known as MGsub(Nc), where the subscript “sub”
describes the kind of historical choices used. When
sub = min(q), we publicly announce the historical qth
minority choices of the past M turns instead of the his-
torical 1st minority choices. (More precisely, we arrange
those alternatives chosen by non-zero number of play-
ers in ascending order of the number of players chosen.
Those alternatives with equal number of players cho-
sen are arranged randomly in this sequence. The qth
minority choice is the qth alternative in this sequence.
In the event that the number of alternatives chosen by
non-zero number of players is less than q, we define the
qth minority choice as the last entry in this sequence.)
Similarly, when sub = maj(q), we publish the histori-
cal qth majority choices of the past M turns. We call
the publicly announced alternatives the history string ir-
respective of the state “sub”. Moreover, we stress that
apart from the global information released, all the rules
in MGsub(Nc) are the same as those of MG(Nc). Thus,
MG(Nc) =MGmin(1)(Nc).
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Following Refs. [4, 6], we measure the degree of player
cooperation by considering the mean variance of atten-
dance over all alternatives (or simply the mean variance)
Σ2 =
1
Nc
∑
i∈GF (Nc)
〈[〈
(Ai(t)
2
〉
t
− 〈Ai(t)〉
2
t
]〉
Ξ
=
〈[〈
(A0(t))
2
〉
t
− 〈A0(t)〉
2
t
]〉
Ξ
, (1)
where the attendance of an alternative Ai(t) is the num-
ber of players picking the alternative i at turn t. Note
that 〈· · ·〉t and 〈· · ·〉Ξ are the expectation values aver-
aged over time and over strategies initially assigned to
the players respectively. Since all the Nc alternatives are
treated on equal footing in MGsub(Nc), we may arrived at
the second line in Eq. (1). The smaller the Σ2, the better
the player cooperates. More importantly, for a fixed S
and up to first order approximation, Σ2 depends only on
the control parameter α = NM+1c /NS which measures
the relative diversity of the strategies used in the system
[23].
Furthermore, to investigate the phase diagram of
MGsub(Nc), we follow Refs. [7, 24] to study the order
parameter
θ =
1
NMc
∑
µ
{∑
Ω
[
〈p(Ω|µ)〉t −
1
Nc
]2}
, (2)
where 〈p(Ω|µ)〉t denotes the time average of the proba-
bility that the current minority choice is Ω conditioned
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FIG. 1: The variance of attendance per player Σ2/N and
the order parameter θ vs. the control parameter α for
(a) MG“sub”(5) and (b) MG“sub”(7). The values of M and S
used in all the figures in this paper are 3 and 2, respectively.
on a global history string µ.
Fig. 1 plots Σ2/N and θ as a function of α for different
“sub” andNc. Each data point presents the average value
over 1000 different runs and the value for each run is aver-
aged over 25000 iterations after discarding the first 20000
iterations to allow equilibration. We find that within the
range of parameters we have simulated, the system in-
deed equilibrates well before the first 20000 iterations.
All Σ2/N curves in Fig. 1 show a similar trend and have
cusps around α ≈ 1 irrespective of the values of Nc and
“sub” used; and the θ curves indicate second order phase
transitions around the cusps separating the symmetric
and the asymmetric phases. (The small drop in Σ2/N
for large value of α in Fig. 1a is due to finite size effect
as the number of players N is about 30.) Although we
only show those curves for Nc = 5 and 7, similar behav-
iors are observed for other values of Nc > 2. In fact, our
numerical simulations show that the critical points of all
curves with the same Nc and S coincide. That is to say,
the critical value αc is found to be a function of Nc and
S only and is independent of the kind of history string
used. Besides, Σ2/N
∣∣
αc
is a function of Nc and S only.
The behavior of Σ2/N away from the phase transition
point αc is also worth mentioning. For α≪ αc, the vari-
ance per player for sub = min(1) is consistently greater
than those obtained in MGs using other public informa-
tion. In contrast, for α & αc, Σ
2/N for sub = maj(1)
is consistently smaller than those obtained in MGs using
other globally announced information.
IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ANALYTICAL
OR SEMI-ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
Three major approaches to study the MG analytically
or semi-analytically are known to date. We briefly dis-
cuss their potentials in solving the MGsub(Nc) one by one
below.
A. Replica Trick
Replica trick was used by Challet et al. to solve the
MG analytically [24, 25, 26]. By using fact that knowing
the majority choice automatically implies the knowledge
of the minority choice when Nc = 2, they wrote down a
simple Hamiltonian quadratic in the random spin vari-
able. Standard replica trick can then be used to com-
pute the probability distribution of the average action of
a player. Subsequently, the quantities such as variance
per player Σ2/N can be computed analytically. Although
the value of Σ2/N obtained by replica trick agrees rea-
sonably well with the numerical findings in the asymmet-
ric phase of the standard MG, the averaging procedure
in replica trick makes this method impossible to recover
the dynamics and the value of Σ2/N in the symmetric
phase.
Replica trick faces a further problem when Nc > 2.
The Hamiltonian involves a term in the form δi,i0 for
some i, i0 ∈ GF (Nc). This term is equal to the degree
(Nc− 1) polynomial
∏
j 6=i0
(i− j)/(i− i0) in random spin
variable and hence the associated saddle point equation
is much harder to solve.
4B. Generating Functional Method
Coolen pioneered the use of generating functional
method to solve the standard MG [27, 28]. This method
is mathematically rigorous and exact. In fact, it can
be used to compute the variance per player Σ2/N in
the asymmetric phase of MG efficiently. Nonetheless,
the presence of long time scale periodic dynamics in the
symmetric phase makes the computation of Σ2/N in this
phase using generation functional method not very suc-
cessfully to date [29].
Applying generation functional method to solve
MGsub(Nc) could face two more problems. First, the
equation governing the evolution from one turn to the
next involves a term in the form δi,i0 for some spin vari-
ables i, i0 ∈ GF (Nc) and hence is equal to a polynomial of
degree (Nc−1). Second, computing the relative popular-
ity of the Nc alternatives are required when sub 6= min(1)
or maj(1). These two requirements add further complex-
ity to the generating functional when Nc > 2.
C. Crowd-Anticrowd Theory
Developed by Hart et al. [21, 22], crowd-anticrowd the-
ory is a semi-analytical method to explain the dynamics
and variance observed in various variants of MG. This
method provides an intuitive understanding of the origin
of player cooperation. Although it predicts the existence
of phase transition around α ≈ 1, it does not give us a
simple way to calculate the value of αc.
Chau et al. [6, 7] have successfully extended the crowd-
anticrowd theory to study the case when the number of
alternatives Nc is a prime power. This makes the theory
a good choice to investigate the dynamics of MGsub(Nc).
V. THE CROWD-ANTICROWD
EXPLANATION
Most of our numerical simulation results can be ex-
plained by the crowd-anticrowd theory. Recall that two
strategies are said to be uncorrelated if the probability
for them to make the same choice equals 1/Nc when av-
eraged over the set of all possible history string. And two
strategies are called anti-correlated if they make differ-
ent choices for every input history string. Besides, two
strategies are said to be significantly different if they are
either anti-correlated or uncorrelated. In fact, one can
form a subset of NM+1c strategies from the full strategy
space in such a way that any two distinct strategies in
this subset are significantly different. Besides, the size of
this subset is maximal in the sense that no such subset
with more than NM+1c strategies exists. This subset is
called the maximal reduced strategy space [5, 6, 21, 22].
Most importantly, numerical simulations show that the
dynamics of MG“sub”(Nc) for strategies taken from the
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FIG. 2: The power spectral density of the auto-correlation
function of the attendance A(t) against frequency for a typi-
cal run in (a) MGmin(1)(5), (b) MGmin(2)(5), (c) MGmaj(1)(5)
and (d) MGmaj(2)(5) averaged by 50 runs for α = 0.05. The
period-NM+1c dynamics is pronounced only in (a).
full or from the maximal reduced strategy spaces are sim-
ilar.
From the discussions in Ref. [6], one may label a strat-
egy in the maximal reduced strategy space by (λ, β) ∈
GF (NMc ) × GF (Nc) in such a way that two strategies
(λ, β) and (λ′, β′) are uncorrelated if and only if λ 6= λ′.
They are anti-correlated if and only if λ = λ′ and β 6= β′.
They are the same if and only if λ = λ′ and β = β′. Ac-
cording to the crowd-anticrowd theory, the mean variance
of attendance Σ2 in MG(Nc) is governed by an ensemble
of mutually uncorrelated sets of anti-correlated strategies
[6, 21, 22]. That is to say,
Σ2 ≈
〈
1
NM+2c
∑
λ,β


∑
β′ 6=β
[Nλ,β(t)−Nλ,β′(t)]


2〉
t,Ξ
,
(3)
where Nλ,β(t) denotes the number of players making
decision according to the strategy (λ, β) in the anti-
correlated strategy set λ in turn t.
When α ≪ αc, known as the symmetric phase, there
is a periodic dynamics in the time series of the minority
choice. According to the crowd-anticrowd theory, this
dynamics leads to a large mean variance of attendance
per player Σ2/N in MGmin(1)(Nc) [21, 22, 23, 30, 31].
Let us briefly review the origin of this periodic dynamics
in MGmin(1)(Nc). When the number of strategies at play
is much larger than the maximal reduced strategy space
size NM+1c , it is very likely for players to employ similar
strategies. Initially, for a given history string µ, every
alternative has equal probability of being the minority.
Moreover, the virtual score of a strategy (λ, β) that gives
the correct prediction of the minority is increased while
that of its anti-correlated strategies are decreased. As
there are more players than the maximal reduced strat-
egy space size, in the next occurrence of the same history
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FIG. 3: The power spectral density of the auto-correlation
function of the attendance A(t) conditioned on an arbitrary
but fixed history against frequency shows the slight strength-
ening of period-Nc dynamics when Nc > 2. Parameters used
in this plot is the same as that in Fig. 2.
string µ, more players may use (λ, β) to pick their alter-
natives. Thus, (λ, β) is less likely to correctly predict the
minority choice due to overcrowding of strategies. Induc-
tively, overcrowding of strategies leads to the existence of
a period-Nc dynamics in the minority choice as well as the
attendance time series conditioned on an arbitrary but
fixed history in MGmin(1)(Nc) [16, 17, 21, 22, 30, 31]. An-
other periodic dynamics coming from a slightly different
origin is also present in MGmin(1)(Nc). Recall that the
history string gives complete information of the winning
choices in the past M turns in MGmin(1)(Nc) making its
minority choice time series highly correlated. By extend-
ing the analysis of Challet and Marsili in Ref. [16] from
Nc = 2 to a general prime power Nc, we conclude that
the minority choice time series from the (NM+1c k + 1)th
to the [NM+1c (k+1)]th turn is likely to form a de Bruijn
sequence2 of length NM+1c for all k ∈ N resulting in a
period NM+1c peak in the Fourier transform of both the
minority choice and the attendance time series [31]. Be-
sides, it is likely that between the above NM+1c turns,
each strategy wins exactly NMc times. We follow the
convention in Ref. [17] by calling this correlation in the
minority choice and attendance time series the period-
NM+1c dynamics. Note that because of the period-N
M+1
c
dynamics, the virtual score difference between any two
strategies is likely to be zero in the (NM+1c k + 1)th turn
for all k ∈ N. We call this phenomenon virtual score reset
[17].
However, for MGsub(Nc) other than MGmin(1)(Nc) or
2 A de Bruijn sequence of length qn over an alphabet of size q is
defined as a sequence that contains all the qn possible n-tuples
as its subsequence. (We allow wraparound when defining a sub-
sequence. For example, 0110 is a de Bruijn sequence of length 4
over the set of alphabets {0, 1}.)
MGmaj (1)(2), the knowledge of the history string does
not give a player complete information on the minority
choice. Suppose again that initially the strategy (λ, β)
correctly predicts the minority choice for a given history
string µ. Since the virtual score calculation is still based
only on the historical minority choices, in the next oc-
currence of µ, strategy (λ, β) may well be able to cor-
rectly predict the minority choice as it is chosen by only
a few players. Therefore, the publicly announced his-
tories from the (NM+1c k + 1)th to the [N
M+1
c (k + 1)]th
turn no longer tend to form a de Bruijn sequence and
the virtual score difference between two distinct strate-
gies is unlikely to reset [17, 31]. That is why the period-
NM+1c dynamics almost completely disappears as shown
in Fig. 2. (Although we only present the periodic dy-
namics and distribution of history strings for the case
of Nc = 5 in Figs. 2–4, our simulations for other values
of Nc are consistent with our crowd-anticrowd explana-
tion in this section.) Nonetheless, from Fig. 3, we observe
that the period-Nc dynamics is slightly strengthened. To
understand why, let us recall that in MGmin(1)(Nc) and
MGmaj (1)(2), the virtual score reset mechanism implies
that the (Nck+1)th terms for all k ∈ N in the attendance
time series conditioned on an individual history is pos-
itively correlated. This is the major contributor to the
period-Nc dynamics. In contrast, for other MGsub(Nc)
and for a fixed ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , Nc, the absence of a virtual
score reset mechanism implies that correlations among
the (Nck + ℓ)th terms for all k ∈ N in the time series
of attendance conditioned on an individual history all
pay about the same contribution to the period-Nc dy-
namics, resulting in a stronger correlation. However, the
strength of this auto-correlation conditioned on a partic-
ular history does not give complete information on the
degree of overcrowding. It is the disappearance of period-
NM+1c dynamics and the absence of virtual score reset
mechanism that make a player more likely to stick to a
strategy. Hence, players cooperate slightly better lead-
ing to a slightly smaller mean variance of attendance in
other MGsub(Nc) [17]. In this way, crowd-anticrowd the-
ory explains not only why all the Σ2/N vs. α curves in
Fig. 1 follows the same trend in the symmetric phase, but
also attributes their slight differences to the strength of
period-Nc dynamics.
We move on to discuss the situation of α & αc, namely,
the asymmetric phase. In this phase, the number of
strategies at play NS is less than the maximal reduced
strategy space size NM+1c . Thus, the probability that
a particular alternative can never be picked by at least
N/Nc players increases as the number of players N de-
creases. By pigeonhole principle, for an alternative to
be the majority choice, the number of players choosing
that alternative must be at least N/Nc. Consequently,
whenever α & αc, some alternatives may never have a
chance to be the majority choice. In contrast, there is no
such type of constraint preventing an alternative from
being a non-maj(1) choice. Therefore, among all the
history string generation methods we have studied, the
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FIG. 4: We plot the frequency of occurrence of history strings
sorted in descending order and then averaged over 50 runs
for (a) MGmaj(1)(5), (b) MGmaj(2)(5), (c) MGmin(1)(5) and
(d) MGmin(2)(5) at α = 1.5.
sub = maj(1) one will generate the most non-uniformly
distributed history strings. This assertion is confirmed
in Fig. 4, which plots the frequency count of the his-
tory occurrence arranged in descending order and then
averaged over 50 runs. As the non-uniformity of history
string leads to a reduction of the effective strategy space
size, the crowd-anticrowd cancellation is strengthened in
the asymmetric phase [16]. Thus, the mean variance of
attendance obtained by using a majority history string is
consistently lower than those obtained by using other his-
tory string generation methods. Again, crowd-anticrowd
theory is able to explain the slight difference in Σ2/N be-
tween maj(1) and non-maj(1) history posting methods in
the asymmetric phase.
Finally, we study the phase transition point α = αc.
The crowd-anticrowd analysis reported earlier attributes
the increase in variance per player by decreasing α in the
symmetric phase (increasing α in the asymmetric phase)
to over-crowding of strategies (insufficient sampling). In
this respect, crowd-anticrowd theory predicts the exis-
tence of a single phase transition point separating the
regions θ = 0 and θ > 0 around α ≈ 1 although it does
not provide an efficient way to compute its value αc. Near
the point of maximal cooperation, the number of strat-
egy at play is approximately equal to NM+1c . In this
regime, the number of players using strategies (λ, β) and
(λ, β′) are always about the same for all β 6= β′. Thus,
from Eq. (3), the small variance at the point of maximal
cooperation is the result of an optimal crowd-anticrowd
cancellation [6, 21, 22]. Recall that two anti-correlated
strategies always give different suggestions irrespective of
the history string. So, it seems reasonable that near the
point of maximal cooperation, the degree of cooperation
and hence the values of αc and Σ
2/N
∣∣
αc
are independent
of the history string generation method “sub”. However,
one should not regard this argument as a firm proof for
the precise values of αc and Σ
2/N
∣∣
αc
may depend in gen-
eral on the complex adaptive dynamics of the system.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
We have introduced a modification of the MG called
MGsub(Nc) and studied its properties numerically. We
argued under the framework of crowd-anticrowd theory
that the general trend of the Σ2/N vs. α curve is in-
dependent of the real history string generation method
although the dynamics of the system depends on the kind
of common history string used. We also numerically find
that αc and Σ
2/N
∣∣
αc
are functions of Nc and S only
and are independent of the type of global history “sub”
used. This finding is consistent with crowd-anticrowd
theory. We remark that although all numerical simu-
lations reported in the paper are performed by picking
the strategies from the full strategy space, the same con-
clusions are reached if the strategies are taken from the
maximal reduced strategy space. To summarize, these
findings together with that in Ref. [17] show that the
level of cooperation among players does not change sig-
nificantly if the minority history string is replaced by a
variety of global data such as the historical majority and
a fake history string.
It is instructive to further extend our analysis to the
case that the rankings of all the Nc alternatives in each of
the previousM turns are used as public information. We
believe that both kinds of periodic dynamics should be
present in the symmetric phase. Verification of these hy-
pothesis by numerical simulation is, however, a very com-
putational intensive task as the maximal reduced strat-
egy space size is prohibitively large except for Nc . 4.
Lastly, our findings imply that one must alter the orig-
inal MG in some other ways in order to significantly
change the trend of the Σ2/N vs. α curve. Possibili-
ties include the use of thermal updating rules [32] and
the introduction of initial bias in virtual score [33, 34].
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